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TRIBAL PROPERTY: THE IOWA RESERVATION
IN OKLAHOMA-AN APPLICATION OF
CELESTINE THRQUGH JOHN
Mary Beth Mohr
Once upon a time, not so very long ago, the United States
District Attorney in Oklahoma City declared firmly and with conviction that "Oklahoma has no Indian Reservations." ' He is not
alone in his opinion. The fairy tale that there are no Indian reservations left in the state of Oklahoma commands the belief of a
majority of persons.2 However, a recent series of United States
Supreme Court cases' requires a reexamination of this glib
assumption. This paper will seek to define the test for
disestablishment, diminishment, or alteration of reservation
boundaries that has been developed in these cases and then to apply that test to one particularly well-qualified candidate for
reclassification as an Oklahoma Indian reservation-the lands of
the Iowa Indians.
The Test for Disestablishment,Diminishment, or Alteration of
Reservation Boundaries
Only Congress can disestablish, diminish, or alter the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and all tracts included within the
reservation remain a part of that reservation until Congress acts
to separate them therefrom." Courts determine whether Congress
did disestablish, diminish, or alter the boundaries of a reservation
by looking to the sometimes elusive "intent of CQngress" in the
act, treaty ratification, or series of actions in question. Recent
Supreme Court cases have considered how this congressional intent is to be determined. 5 These cases make clear that the decision
as to whether Congress intends to disestablish, diminish, or alter
1. "Horse Betting Illegal Attorney Says," Oklahoma Daily, Feb. 5, 1979, at 5, col.
3, quoting Larry Patton.
2. Author's unscientific opinion polls of both Indians and non-Indians. Some people are willing to concede that parts of Osage County are a "mineral reserve."
3. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); United States v. Celestine,
215 U.S. 278 (1909).
4. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909).
5. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430
U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); United States v. Celestine,
215 U.S. 278 (1909).
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the boundaries is determined by the unique facts and circumstances of each individual case.
Congressional intent to disestablish, diminish, or alter reservation boundaries "must be clear, to overcome 'the general rule
that doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak
and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.' '" "Accordingly, the
Court requires that the 'Congressional determination to terminate
. . .be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative history.' "M
The earlier cases looking at the question of disestablishment
appeared to say that if disestablishment, diminishment, or alteration did not appear on the face of the act(s) of Congress under
judicial scrutiny, the court could not inquire further and would
be required to hold the reservation to be still intact.' In Rosebud
Siowc Tribe v. Kneip,9 the Court dispelled this appearance by saying: "[Tihe notion that such express language in an Act is the
only method by which congressional action may result in
disestablishment is quite inconsistent with [the second clause of
the Mlattz test which is set out in the above paragraph]."' 1
Therefore, express language in the act such as "do hereby cede,
sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their right,
title, claim and interest" is not necessarily required in order that a
court find reservation boundaries to have been disestablished,
dimirdshed, or altered.
The cases have held that certain factors are irrelevant to a finding of congressional intent to disestablish, diminish, or alter
reservation boundaries. Most important of these factors having
no direct bearing on the question of congressional intent is the
fact that the lands in question were opened for settlement. In
Mattz v. Arnett,' it was argued by the director of the California
Department of Fish and Game that such an opening to
homesteaders militated against a continuation of reservation
6. DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975), quoting from Mattz v.
Arnett, 411 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).

7. DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975), quoting from Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).
8. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351

(1962).
9. 430 U.S. 584, 588 n.4 (1977).
10. Id.
11. 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973).
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status. The Court concluded that this was a misreading of the
effect of the 1892 act for the allotment of lands on the Klamath
River Indian Reservation. The Court said:
The meaning of those terms [in the Klamath River Act] is to be
ascertained from the overview of the earlier General Allotment
Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. That Act permitted the President to
make allotments of reservation lands to resident Indians and,
with tribal consent, to sell surplus lands. Its policy was to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian
lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indiansfor agriculture
and the
and grazing. When all the lands had been allotted,
12
trust expired, the reservation could be abolished.
A reservation will not be held to be disestablished, diminished
or altered merely because patents to lands thereon located have3
been issued. This was recognized in United States v. Celestine,'
and was codified in Title 18 of the United States Code. Title 18
deals with Crimes and Criminal Procedure." ' Section 1152 of this
title provides that: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of
offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia,
shall extend to the Indian Country."13
Section 1151 of the same title defines "Indian country" as including, inter alia: "[A]U land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Govern,,.
ment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent.
Accordingly, the mere issuance of patents does not destroy reservation status.
Another "nonfactor" in the determination of congressional intent is the fact, standing alone, that some unallotted lands located
on the reservation were ceded by the tribe. In DeCoteau v.
District Court,1 7 the Sisseton-Wahpeton allotment agreement
there under construction was distinguished from other allotment
agreements of the period. The Sisseton-Wahpeton agreement was
12. Id. (emphasis added).

13. 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909).
14. While on their face these sections are concerned only with criminal jurisdiction,
the Court has recognized that they generally apply as well to questions of civil jurisdiction. DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970).

16. 18 U.S.C. § 15l1(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
17. 420 U.S. 425, 439 (1975).
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held to have disestablished that reservation, while the other
agreements had not disestablished their respective reservations.
The Court said:
[TI]he Congress included the Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement in
a comprehensive Act which also ratified several other agreements providing for the outright cession of surplus reservation
lands"8 to the Government. The other agreements employed
cession language virtually identical to that in the SissetonWahpeton Agreement, but in these other cases the Indians sold
only a described portion of their lands, rather than all
"unallotted" portions, the result being merely a reduction in
the size of the affected reservations. 9
ARl of this is to say that "[E]ven a cession of lands, so long as
it is not a cession of all unallotted lands, will not result in a termination of the reservation." 20
Referring to a reservation in the past tense, as where the allotmen t act referred to "what was [the] Klamath River Reservation,"'' does not indicate any clear intent of Congress to terminate the reservation directly or by innuendo.22 Nor does the
fact that the actions of Congress being interpreted were unilateral
actions by that body without the consent of the affected tribe
have any direct bearing on the question of disestablishment.23
The question of disestablishment is one of congressional intent.
That intent can exist with or without the consent of the tribe. 4
It appeared from the earlier cases that certain factors were
26
2
determinative of congressional intent. 1 However, Kneip
declares that these factors are not absolutes.
The focus of our inquiry is congressional intent. This Court
has pointed in its prior decisions to factors from which intent is
18. Portions of the reservation remaining after allotment.
19. DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 439 (1975).
20. Pipestem, The Journey from Ex Parte Crow Dog to Littlechief. A Survey of
Tribal Civil and CriminalJurisdiction in Western Oklahoma, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 40
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Pipestem].
21. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 498 (1973) (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1977).
24. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which held that the United
States Congress possessed the authority to unilaterally abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty.
25. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351
(1962).
26. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
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inferred. The dissent erroneously seizes upon several factors
and presents them as apparent absolutes, post, at 1378-1379.
This, however, misapprehends the nature of our inquiry, which
is to inquire whether a congressional determination to terminate is "expressed on the face of the Act or [is] clear from
the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.""
One of these factors, considered useful, although not absolute,
in determining congressional intent to disestablish, diminish, or
alter reservation boundaries is the "jurisdictional history" over
the lands in controversy. In Mattz and Seymour, the conclusions
that the involved reservations had not been terminated were
"reinforced by repeated recognition of the reservation status of
. by the Department of the Interior and by
the land ..
Congress.'"12

Jurisdictional history contributed to an opposite result in
Kneip, in which the reservation was held to have been diminished,
the Court saying:
Since state jurisdiction over the area within a reservation's
boundaries is quite limited, 18 USC § 1151; McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Commn', Williams v. Lee, Worcester v. Georgia,
[citations omitted], the fact that neither Congress nor the
Department of Indian Affairs [sic] has sought to exercise its
authority over this area, or to challenge the State's exercise of
authority is a factor entitled to weight as a part of the
"jurisdictional history." The longstanding assumption of
jurisdiction by the State over an area that is over 90% nonIndian, both in population and in land use, not only
demonstrates the parties' understanding of the meaning of the
Act, but has created justifiable expectations which should not
be upset by so strained a reading of the Acts of Congress as
petitioner urges. We are simply unable to conclude that the intent of the 1904 Act was other than to disestablish. 30
Another factor that the Court has found useful in determining
congressional intent is the presence or absence of express
language of termination. During the era of allotment, numerous
bills were introduced and passed that expressly provided for the
27. Id. at 588 n.4, quotingfrom Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).
28. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973). See also United States v. John, 437
U.S. 634 (1978); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962).
29. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 603-605 (1977).

30. Id.
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termination of reservations and did so in unequivocal terms. The
Court sees this as an indication that "Congress was fully aware of
the means by which termination could be effected."" The
absence of such express terminology tends to negate an intent to
tenninate. 2 Ambiguous expressions will be construed in favor of
the Indians."
The Test Applied to the Iowa Lands in Oklahoma

The Iowa Tribe had emigrated from Nebraska to Kansas to
Oklahoma, being swept in front of America's "manifestly destined" westward expansion. Their reservation in Oldahoma was
created by Executive Order of Chester A. Arthur on August 15,
1883:
It is hereby ordered that the following-described tract of country in the Indian Territory, viz: Commencing at the point
where the Deep Fork of the Canadian River intersects the west
boundary of the Sac and Fox Reservation; thence north along
said west boundary to the south bank of the Cimarron River;
thence up said Cimarron River to the Indian meridian; thence
south along said Indian meridian to the Deep Fork of the
Canladian River; thence down said Deep Fork to the place of
beginning, be, and the same hereby is, set apart for the permanent use and occupation of the Iowa and such other Indians as
the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to locate thereon. 4
On May 20, 1890, the Iowa Tribe accepted an allotment agreemeit concerning the above created reservation. This agreement,
along with that made with the Sac and Fox, was ratified by Congress on February 13, 1891. 3" It is interesting to note that both
agreements were included in the same congressional enactment
because both contain language indicating that the congressional
intent was other than disestablishment. The present discussion
will be limited to analysis of the Iowa agreement.
Article I of the Iowa Agreement provides:

31. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 (1973).
:2. Id.
33. DeCoteau v. District Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975), quoting from McClanahan
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 441 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
34. Executive Order of Chester A. Arthur, Aug. 15, 1883, in 1 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN
AFFAIRs,
LAWS AND TREAnIEs 843 (2d ed. 1904).
35. 26 Stat. 749 (1891).
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The said Iowa Tribe of Indians, residing and having their homes
thereon, upon the conditions hereinafterexpressed, do hereby
surrender and relinquish to the United States all their right, title,
claim and interest in and to and over the following described
tract of country in the Indian Territory, namely .... 11
Standing alone, this language is equivalent to language the
Supreme Court has pronounced to be "precisely suited to this
purpose [of disestablishment], "I" evidencing "an unmistakeable
baseline purpose of disestablishment." 38
However, this first article includes the phrase, "Upon the conditions hereinafter expressed," which later conditions, at the very
least, cast a doubt upon the intentions of Congress and thereby
trigger the legal maxim of McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission" that "doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of
the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation,
dependent upon its protection and good faith."4' 0
The most striking of these later conditions appear in Articles V
and XII of the Agreement. Articles II and III also contain
language that seemingly manifests a congressional intention of
continued reservation status.41 Article V states:
There shall be excepted from the operation of this agreement a
tract of land, not exceeding ten acres in a square form, including the church and school house and grave-yard at or near
the Iowa village, and ten acres of land shall belong to said
Iowa tribe of Indians in common so long as they shall use the
same for religious, educational, and burial purposes for their
said Tribe-but whenever they shall cease to use the same for
such purposes for their Tribe, said tract of land shall belong to
the United States. 2
In accordance with the provisions of Article V, this ten-acre
tract was "reserved from allotment and public entry."143 Its loca36. 26 Stat. 749, 754 (1891) (emphasis added).
37. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), quoting DeCoteau v.
District Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975).
38. Id.
39. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).

40. Id. at 174.
41. For a discerning discussion of these, see Pipestem, supra note 20, at 43-45.
42. 26 Stat. 749, 755 (1891) (emphasis added).
43. Memorandum from Anadarko Field Solicitor to Anadarko Area Director, "Title
Status of a Ten-acre Tract Reserved for the Iowa Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma," at p. 2

(Sept. 1, 1963).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1979

342

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

tion was noted in a Departmental Order of November 6, 1912."
The tract is shown on the allotment schedule as having been set
aside for the Iowa Tribe and no patent therefor has ever been
issued. 5 The Bureau of Indian Affairs still regards this tract as
trust land of the Iowa Tribe. 6 Under the "jurisdictional history"
factor considered important in the cases, 7 this treatment of the
land offers strong evidence negating disestablishment. The Court
of Claims has also treated the Iowa lands as a continuing reservation. 48 The Court described the Iowa property in 1929 as "The
reservation occupied by [the Iowas], ' 49 and of Article V, says,
"A stipulated reservation of acreage was made for religious and
educational purposes. ...
This brings us to a consideration of what the word "excepted"
means. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "except:"
"to take out, except from"; "to take or leave out, except from";
"to take or leave out from a number or a whole: exclude"; "to
take exception: object."'"
Under a well-recognized principle of construction," courts will
construe treaties of the United States with Indians "as 'that
unlettered people' understood it, and 'as justice and reason de-

m and.'

',s3

An argument that the doctrine developed in this line of cases
applies only to treaties with Indians can be countered with the
"plain and ordinary meaning" doctrine and the general rule of

McClanahan.5,
The courts have construed the word "except" in its plain
meaning. In Conley v. Ballinger," the Supreme Court held the
language: "The Wyandotte Nation hereby cede and relinquish to
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 3.

47. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
48. Iowa Tribe of Indians v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 585 (1929).
49. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).

50. Id. at 604 (emphasis added). A search of legislation subsequent to the allotment
agreement reveals that none of this legislation deals even tangentially with the issue of
continued reservation status vel non.
51. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGATE DICTIONARY 398 (1977).
52. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Marlin v. Lewallen, 276
U.S. 58 (1928); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).

53. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 n.2 (1968), quoting United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905).

54. See text accompanying notes 6, 33, 39, and 40, supra.
55. 216 U.S. 84 (1910).
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the United States all their right, title and interest in and to the
tract of country... [description] ...except as follows, viz: The

portion now inclosed as a public burying ground shall be permanently reserved and appropriated for that purpose; ...

56

The Court held that "except" retained the tribal interest in the
land so described. 7 Reservation status vel non was not in issue in
the case.
It appears then, that at least this ten-acre tract of the Iowa
lands continues its reservation status.
Article XII of the Iowa Allotment Agreement states:
It is further agreed that when said allotments are being made,
the Chief of the Iowas may select an additional ten acres in a
square form for the use of said tribe in said reservation, conforming in boundaries to the legal subdivisions of land therein,
which shall be held by said tribe in common but when abandoned by said tribe shall become the property of the United
States. 8
This land was selected as provided for in the Agreement.59 It
was sold in 1902 under Guthrie cash entry by the Bureau of Land
Management. 6° This sale might be held invalid because it may
have been outside the scope of the Bureau of Land Management's
authority.61
In any event, the language indicating that simultaneously with
the allotment process, the Iowa chief may select an additional
ten-acre tract "in said reservation" points to a congressional inshould continue through the allottent that the reservation status
62
thereafter.
and
period
ment
Other language throughout the Agreement contemplates a reservation after allotment. Article II declares that: "Each and every
member of said Iowa Tribe of Indians shall be entitled to select and
56. rd. at 85 (emphasis added).
57. See also Adams v. Osage Tribe, 59 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1910): "Except" is
"appropriate when some part or parcel of the thing granted is withdrawn from the operation of the conveyance," and in AG 6:658, 663 (1854), "except" meant that described
lands were withdrawn from the terms of the agreement.
58. 26 Stat. 749, 757 (1891).
59. Interview, William Pruner, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Shawnee Agency, with
author (Nov. 2, 1979).
60. Id.
61. Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (1976).
62. Pipestem, supra note 20, at 45.
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locate upon said reservation or tract of Country eighty acres of
land which shall be allotted to such Indian in severalty .. "63
Article III provides, inter alia: "and when all of said allotments
are made and approved, then the residue of said reservation, except as hereinafter stated, [Articles V and XII] shall, as far as
said Iowa Indians are concerned, become public land of the
United States." 64
As was discussed earlier in this paper,"' issuance of patents
within a reservation is not dispositive to a conclusion of reservation termination, nor is the opening of reservation lands to settlement dispositive of the issue. 66
Furthermore, the Court has determined that the intent of the
General Allotment Act67 was "to continue the reservation system
and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and grazing. When all the lands
had been allotted
and the trust expired, the reservation could be
'6
aboished." 1
The Iowa Allotment Agreement can be analogized to the
General Allotment Act. As one prominent expert on Oklahoma
Indian land law commented: "The [Iowa] agreement does not
specifically provide that allotments shall be made subject to the
General Allotment Act, as is customary, but, the provisions of
the agreement are substantially identical with that act and its
'69
amendments, and will no doubt, receive a similar construction.
It should also be noted that the Iowa Agreement compares with
the agreements discussed in DeCoteau, wherein the reservations
were held not to be disestablished. 70 Even if the language of Article I of the Iowa Agreement is viewed as language of outright cession, 1 the clause, "Upon the conditions hereinafter expressed,"
which conditions include Articles V and XII, negates a conclusion
that all unallotted lands were to be ceded.
Congress knew how to provide expressly for the termination of
reservations and did so in many instances. The absence of such
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

26 Stat. 749, 754 (1891) (emphasis added.
26 Stat. 749, 755 (1891) (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 13-16, supra.
See text accompanying notes 11 and 12, supra.
24 Stat. 388 (1887).
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973) (emphasis added).
L. MILLS, OKLAHOMA INDIAN LAND LAWS § 381 (2d ed. 1924).
See text accompanying notes 17-20, supra.
But see text accompanying notes 36-40, supra.
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express terms in the Iowa Agreement also tends to negate congressional intent to terminate the Iowa Reservation."
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, this writer tends to agree with the
statement of the prominent Indian law authority who summarized the situation in regard to the Iowa lands in Oklahoma as
follows: "It can be forcefully argued that the language of the
Iowa Allotment Agreement is ambiguous on the disestablishment
question and, in fact, in applying the judicial doctrine of the
Surpeme Court either continuation or diminishment of the reservation boundaries is strongly indicated rather than termination." 73
The congressional intent to disestablish, diminish, or alter the
boundaries is not clearly expressed on the face of the Iowa Allotment Agreement nor is it clear from either the surrounding circumstances looked to by the Supreme Court in the cases or from
the legislative history.7" Therefore, under the rule that doubtful
and ambiguous expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indians,7" it appears that an Iowa Indian Reservation is alive and
well in the state of Oklahoma.

72. See text accompanying notes 31-33, supra.

73. Pipestem, supra note 20, at 45.
74. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973).
75. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
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